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Abstract
We have studied the incentives of forming coalitions in the Airport
Problem. It has shown that in this class of games, if coalitions form
freely, the Shapley value does not lead to the formation of grand or
coalitions with many players. Just a coalition with a few number of
players forms to act as the producer and other players would be the
consumers of the product. We have found the two member coalition
which forms and we have checked its stability.
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1 Introduction
One of the most important problems in cooperative game theory is that which
coalitions will form. Coalition formation today has a rich literature in game
theory. Examples of coalition formation include professors who would like to
choose a university to join among different ones, soccer players who want to
change their teams, persons who would like to join communities and clubs,
countries which calculate the benefits and costs of joining different interna-
tional societies such as OPEC, WTO, NAFTA, EU, NATO, etc.
Besides this, the question of how to allocate the worth of a coalition to differ-
ent players participating in it arises. There are different solution concepts for
this question in the cooperative game theory literature. One of the most im-
portant of these allocation rules is the Shapley value, suggested by Shapley in
1953. This solution concept has several nice properties such as it is the unique
solution of a cooperative game that satisfies efficiency, additivity, symmetry,
and dummy player property. This solution concept can be suggested for each
finite TU cooperative game. Shapley suggests the value Φi(v) to player i in a
cooperative game (N, v) as:
Φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!
[v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)]
This is a weighted average of all possible marginal worths for player i. As
it has many desirable properties, the Shapley value has many applications in
cooperative game theory. Here, we consider this allocation rule as a currently
accepted rule for the allocation of the value of a cooperative game among its
players. One should notice that we can consider a cooperative game from
two different points of view. In one, there is a government which allocates
the worth of a coalition to its members and the players should accept their
assigned payoffs or leave the game. In the other point of view, we assume
that coalitions form freely and there is no government. So, players who form
a coalition should decide themselves how to allocate the worth of the coalition
among themselves. In this paper we take the second point of view which is
more usual in real world situations. That is, some firms (players) in order to
increase their profits, form a coalition and allocate its worth among themselves.
Forming a coalition and playing a cooperative game has some gains for all
the players participating in the game, but in real world forming a coalition
usually takes a long time and has some difficulties. One of these difficulties is
that although all the player are aware of the benefits of forming a coalition,
they usually do not agree on how to distribute the benefits of the cooperation
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among themselves immediately. They usually put a lot of time and effort on
bargaining to agree on how to do it. This process gets more complicated and
difficult to settle down as the number of players increases. Although there
are some solution concepts for the problem of how to distribute the benefits
of a cooperative game among players such as Shapley value and Nucleolus,
these concepts just can settle down by a governor and it is not done in a free
cooperative game in which there is no government and so the bargaining power
or other kinds of players’ power determine the distribution structure.
Another reason which describes why coalitions with more than a specified
number of members in some games do not form is that it is more profitable
for some players to form a small coalition -which is also easier to form rather
than forming a large one- and then charge other players for using the product
of their cooperation.
Now we take a look at some types of coalition formation models used in the
literature.
2 Different types of coalition formation
2.1 Open Membership
Under this rule of coalition formation, in a game membership in a coalition is
open to all players who are willing to abide the rule of that coalition. This type
of coalition formation is designed to model an environment in which players
are free to form any coalition as long as no player would like to join a coalition.
2.2 Infinite Horizon Coalition Unanimity Game
In this rule of coalition formation, a coalition forms if and only if all potential
members agree to form that coalition. The process is as follows: First player
1 makes a proposal for a coalition e.g. {1, 4, 6, 8}. Then the player with the
smallest label in the proposed coalition -here player 4- accepts or rejects the
proposal. If player 4 accepts, then it is the time for player 6 to accept or
reject the proposal, and the process goes on until we reach the player with the
maximum index on the coalition proposed by player 1. If any of the potential
members rejects the proposal of player 1, then the proposal is thrown out
and the player who first rejects the proposal starts over by proposing another
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coalition. If instead, all members of the proposal made by player 1 accept
the proposal, then they form the coalition. The remaining players continue
the coalition formation game, starting by the player with the smallest index
making a proposal to the rest of players. In this rule of coalition formation
once a coalition forms, it can not break apart, admit new members, or merge
with other coalition, regardless how to act the rest of players. If all potential
coalitions got rejected, the game finishes and all players will act alone.
2.3 Equilibrium Binding Agreements
Ray and Vohra (94) suggest the Equilibrium Binding Agreements (EBA) as a
rule of coalition formation as follows:
A coalition structure C = {S1, ..., Sm} is stable if and only if there do not exist
(1) a sub coalition of coalition Sˆi in C and (2) a more refined coalition struc-
ture C ′ which can be induced by deviation by these Sˆi leading perpetrators,
such that these Sˆi leading perpetrators are better off under C
′ than under C.
In EBA theory a strategy vector for the grand coalition is blocked if a leading
perpetrator S ⊂ N can induce another strategy under a finer coalition struc-
ture which would make itself better off. This new coalition structure should be
stable such that coalitions should not break apart due to some further devia-
tors. In addition, if the deviation of S involves the changing in other coalitions
as well, all newly formed coalitions must be better off than before the deviation
of S.
2.4 Two Stage Model
This model of coalition formation is used in different types by Myerson (78),
Shenoy (79), Hart and Kurz (83), Aumann and Myerson (88), Bloch (95, 96),
Ray and Vohra (94, 95) and Yi and Shin (95). The model considers the
formation of multiple coalitions and examines the equilibrium number and
sizes of coalitions. In this model, in the first stage, players form coalitions
and in the second stage, coalitions engage in a noncooperative game, given the
coalition structure determined from the first stage. Under some assumptions,
the equilibrium is unique for any coalition structure. Although different types
of this model share the common objective of analyzing the equilibrium, each
of these types adopts a different notion of stability of a coalition structure.
Bloch (95, 96) examines an infinite horizon coalition unanimity game in which
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a coalition forms if and only if all members agree to form the coalition. Ray
and Vohra (94) consider the Equilibrium Binding Agreements rule under which
coalitions are allowed only to break up into smaller subcoalitions. Yi and Shin
(95) investigate the Open Membership game in which members can join an
existing coalition without the agreement of the members of the coalition which
he is now a member of. The main difference between these rules of coalition
formation is the question that if an existing coalition can break apart, admit
new members, or merge with other coalitions or not? It is obvious that different
rules of coalition formation may lead to different coalition structures.
2.5 Proposal Model
Perry and Reny (94, Econometrica) suggested this process of coalition forma-
tion. First we have a definition:
Definition 2.1 A proposal is a pair (x, S) in which S ⊆ N and x is a vector
where for all i ∈ S, xi is the payoff assigned to player i and
∑
i∈S xi = v(S).
The method of coalition formation which is proposed by Perry and Reny is
as follows: The game starts at t = 0 at which a player in N can choose to
make a proposal or to be quiet. Time is continuous. At every positive time t,
any player can choose to make a proposal, accept the current proposal (x, S)
if he is a member of S, be quiet, or leave and consume. A proposal becomes
binding, when it is accepted by all members of the relevant coalition. Once
a player accepts a proposal, he must remain quiet i.e. he can neither make a
new proposal nor leave to consume, until that proposal becomes binding, or
it is replaced by a new proposal. Once a proposal (x, S) gets binding, we say
that the coalition S has formed. After this formation, any player i in S can
leave and consume xi which he gets from his cooperation in coalition S or look
for a better proposal.
Now, we take a look at the coalition formation in the games that the formation
of a coalition has some externalities for the players who do not participate in
the coalition.
First we have a definition.
Definition 2.2 A Partition Function is a function which assigns a value
to each coalition in a coalition structure as a function of the entire coalition
structure.
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This definition means that the value of a coalition does not just depend on
the members of the coalition but also on the coalition structure in which that
coalition is a member. Yi (97) shows that under a set of conditions on the
partition function in the coalition formation in which the formation of coali-
tions produce negative externalities to nonmembers, the grand coalition is an
equilibrium outcome under the Open Membership rule, but typically not under
the Coalition Unanimity rule nor the Equilibrium Binding Agreements rule.
In addition he shows that the Coalition Unanimity rule and the Equilibrium
Binding Agreements rule do better than Open Membership rule, but the grand
coalition is typically not a stable outcome under these two rules either. He
also proves that in the coalition formation with positive externalities -those
coalition which their formation have positive externalities for non members-
unlike the case of negative externalities, Open Membership does not support
the grand coalition as an equilibrium outcome.
3 Airport Problem
Suppose n types of airplanes would like to build a runway for landing on.
The types of airplanes are different and so the characteristics of bands which
they need and the cost of construction of bands are different. We assume
that it costs Ci to player type i to build the band alone and if two airplanes
have the same cost, we consider them as the same type. Without loss of
generality we can assume C1 < C2 < ... < Cn. One of the assumptions in the
Airport Problem is that if coalition {(i1, i2, ..., ik)}, ij ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} such that
i1 < i2 < ... < ik forms and builds the band, all players of type j, j ≤ ik can
use the band built by this coalition but no player i > ik can use it.
The standard cooperative game in this problem is that if N = {1, 2, ..., n} for
each S ⊆ N the cost for coalition S to build the band is:
c(S) = Max{Cj | j ∈ S}
in which c(S) is the characteristic cost function. Obviously,
c(N) = Cn
The saving game related to this cost structure is G = (N, s) in which:
s(S) =
∑
j∈S
Cj − c(S)
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Definition 3.1 A Cooperative game is a pair G = (N, v) in which N =
{1, 2, ..., n} is the finite set of players and v : 2N → < is the characteristic
function such that v(φ) = 0.
Definition 3.2 A cooperative game G = (N, v) is called superadditive if:
∀K,L ⊆ N ;K ∩ L = φ =⇒ v(K ∪ L) ≥ v(K) + v(L)
Definition 3.3 A cooperative game G = (N, v) is convex if:
∀K,L ⊆ N ; v(K ∪ L) + v(K ∩ L) ≥ v(K) + v(L)
Definition 3.4 A cost game G = (N, c)is called subadditive if:
∀K,L ⊆ N ; c(K ∪ L) ≤ c(K) + c(L)
In the Airport Problem if the cost game is subadditive, the saving game would
be superadditive. This game is also convex.
Littlechild and Owen(1973) have shown that if the grand coalition forms, the
Shapley value assigns the cost yi to player i by:
yi = yi−1 +
Ci − Ci−1∑n
k=i nk
in which nk is the number of players of type k and y0 = C0 = 0 . For simplicity
we assume ni = 1 for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. So, the Shapley value allocate the
cost :
yi = yi−1 +
Ci − Ci−1
n− i+ 1
to player i for using the service which is produced by the grand coalition. In
this paper we would like to explore if this allocation rule could lead to a stable
grand coalition or if it is more profitable (or with less cost for using the band)
for some players to leave the grand coalition and form another coalition and
behave in a different way.
4 Coalition Formation in the Airport Problem
To form a coalition, players should bargain to achieve an agreement on how to
distribute the value of the coalition among themselves. We assume that at any
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time, each player chooses the best choice possible for him. In this problem,
the best choice is the one offering him the service which he needs by the lowest
cost. If coalition S = {(i1, i2, ..., ik)}, ij ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}∀j = 1, 2, ..., k in which
i1 < i2 < ... < ik forms, all players l < ik can use the service produced by
this coalition. This coalition can potentially charge other players Cik−1. By
potential charge we mean that if the coalition S is the only coalition which
has formed, it can suggest the use of the band built by it to all players type
l < ik. The reason that they can charge others Cik−1 is that the best thing that
players {1, 2, ..., ik}\S can do is that to form the coalition {1, 2, ..., ik}\S and
build the band themselves and the cost of building the band for this coalition
would be Cik−1.
The process of forming a coalition is as follows: Any player i ∈ N can propose
a coalition S if i ∈ S. A coalition will form if all its members agree on forming
it and if so, they would write a contract and then they would build the band.
If player i at the same time is a member of several proposed coalitions, he
would accept the one which suggest him using the band with the lowest cost.
Obviously he would not like to be a member of two coalition as he should
pay additional cost which is not necessary as one band would be sufficient for
him. Due to the characteristic of Airport Problem, if n 6∈ S, in the case that
coalition S forms and build the band, by sure another band would be built
for the use of player n. So, if n 6∈ S and S forms, it would not be the only
producer of the band. So, coalition S can not charge other players who do not
cooperate with S the amount Cik−1 and the charging amount would diminish
because if one of the two producer charges the amount a for a type of airplane,
the other would suggest a−ε to the same type as the marginal cost of using the
band is zero, so the previous one would suggest a− 2ε and so on. As a result,
in order that coalition S forms and it can charge other players j < ik, j 6∈ S,
we should have n ∈ S. Therefore, player n is the one who decides to cooperate
with whom and to form which coalition.
We claim that in the Airport Problem, if coalitions form freely as in open
Membership method, the Shapley value allocation rule does not lead to form
the grand coalition. To prove this claim, we consider a society in which the
Shapley value is accepted as the rule of distributing the values of coalitions
among their members or allocating the cost of building a product among those
who use it. We show that in this society grand coalition does not form.
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4.1 Norms of the society for cooperation
We assume that the society of the players follows two norms in their coopera-
tion:
1- If two players form a coalition, they would allocate the cost of producing the
service among themselves by the Shapley value cost allocation rule or propor-
tional to their cost of producing the service when acting alone, i.e. if player i
and j such that i < j form a coalition, player i would pay Ci
Ci+Cj
.Cj and player
j would pay
Cj
Ci+Cj
.Cj to build the band with the cost of Cj
2- After producing the service by a coalition, each member of it would get
proportional of the cost that he has paid to produce the service from what the
coalition may earn. For example, if player i has paid 30 percent of the cost of
producing the service by the coalition, he would get 30 percent of the amount
that the coalition get as the charging fee from other players who would like to
use their service and pay the charging fee.
5 Examples:
5.1 Example 1.
Ci = i; i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
We consider coalitions with two members. If player n forms a coalition with
player n − 1, they can potentially charge other players n − 2 units. As we
assumed, they will distribute the benefit of n− 2 proportional to the amount
that they have paid. Here we assume they allocate the cost of building the
band between themselves by the Shapley value. Due to simplified Shapley
value formula player k should pay Φk to produce the service as:
Φ
{n,n−1}
n = 1 + n−12 =
n+1
2
Φ
{n,n−1}
n−1 =
n−1
2
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Potential revenue of charging other players would be:
R(n){n,n−1} = (n+1)/2
n
.(n− 2)
R(n− 1){n,n−1} = (n−1)/2
n
.(n− 2)
Net cost of using the service will be:
NC(n){n,n−1} = n+1
2
− n+1
2
.n−2
n
= n+1
2
.(1− n−2
n
) = n+1
n
NC(n− 1){n,n−1} = n−1
2
.(1− n−2
n
) = n−1
n
If player n forms a coalition with player k, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n− 2} we will have:
Φ
{n,k}
n = n− k/2
Φ
{n,k}
k = k/2
Potential revenue for each of the two players will be:
R(n){n,k} = n−k/2
n
.(n− 1)
R(k){n,k} = k/2
n
.(n− 1)
So, the net cost of using the service for player n and k would be:
NC(n){n,k} = (n− k
2
).(1− n−1
n
) = (n− k
2
). 1
n
NC(k){n,k} = k
2
.(1− n−1
n
) = k
2n
Player n minimizes his net cost over all players k. It is obvious that the net
cost for player n is minimized when k gets the largest possible amount which
is here n−2. Thus, the minimum net cost which player n should pay would be:
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(n− n− 2
2
).
1
n
=
n+ 2
2n
To find the partner who minimizes the net cost of using the service, player n
compares n+2
2n
and n+1
n
and decides to form the coalition with player n− 2 as
his net cost would be n+2
2n
which is absolutely less than n+1
n
. Thus coalition
{n, n− 2} forms.
One may think of that it may diminish the cost for player n to produce the
service alone and then charge others. In this case he should pay the cost of
one unit which is more than n+2
2n
for all n > 2. As n increases player n has
more incentive to cooperate with player n−2 as his net cost of using the band
decreases more.
Now we have the definition of stability:
Definition 5.1 We call a coalition stable if the cost for all its members are
minimized when they join that coalition rather than forming any other coali-
tion.
Note that this definition which we use in our model is different from the defi-
nition of stability in 2.3.
Not considering coalition {n, n − 2}, the coalition that minimizes the cost
for player n − 2 is {n − 2, n − 4} in which his cost would be n−2+2
2(n−2) . Com-
paring this cost with n−2
2n
we observe that n
2(n−2) >
n−2
2n)
for all amounts of n
. We should also consider the coalition {n−2, n−1}. In this coalition we have:
NC(n− 2){n−1,n−2} = n−2
2
(1− n−3
n−1) (I)
While in coalition {n, n− 2} we have:
NC(n− 2){n,n−2} = n−2
2
(1− n−1
n
) (II)
For stability we should have (II)<(I). We see that:
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1− n−1
n
< 1− n−3
n−1 ⇔ 1n < 2n−1 ⇔ n− 1 < 2n
which always occurs.
As a result, the coalition {n, n− 2} is stable as it minimizes the cost for both
players n and n− 2.
If player n wants to form the grand coalition with all other players which min-
imizes his cost in the Shapley value cost allocation rule, he should pay the cost:
n∑
i=1
1
n
=
1
n
+
1
n− 1 + ...+
1
2
+ 1
which is much more than n+2
2n
. For example if we let n = 5 the cost will be
0.7 for player n while in the Shapley value allocation rule it would be:
1
5
+
1
4
+
1
3
+
1
2
+ 1 =
137
60
This amount is even more than 2 while in other way it would be 0.7. For the
case n = 15, the net cost that player n should pay in coalition {n, n − 2} is
0.57 while in the grand coalition he should pay 3.32. As n increases player n
has more incentive to form coalition {n, n−2} rather than the grand coalition
for two reasons: The first reason is that it gets much more difficult and it takes
more time so that the grand coalition forms and the second one is that the
cost decreases noticeably in the case of forming the coalition {n, n− 2} rather
than the grand coalition.
5.2 Example 2.
Ci = i
2, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
If coalition {n, n−1} forms, by the Shapley value cost allocation rule we have:
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Φ
{n,n−1}
n = n2 − (n−1)22
Φ
{n,n−1}
n−1 =
(n−1)2
2
and so the net cost which player n should pay for using the service would be:
NC(n){n,n−1} = (n2 − (n−1)2
2
)(1− (n−2)2
n2
) (III)
If player n forms a coalition with player k, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n − 2}, his net cost
would be:
NC(n){n,k} = (n2 − k2
2
)(1− (n−1)2
n2
) (IV)
As they potentially can charge other players (n− 1)2 units.
Player n minimized the net cost in (IV) over all k and k = n− 2 is the answer
of this minimization. If he forms the coalition with player n − 2 his net cost
would be:
NC(n){n,n−2} = (n2 − (n−2)2
2
)(1− (n−1)2
n2
) (V)
Comparing this amount with the net cost of using the service in the case of
formation the coalition with player n− 1 we observe that always (V)<(III).
Proof. (n2 − (n−2)2
2
)(1− (n−1)2
n2
) < (n2 − (n−1)2
2
)(1− (n−2)2
n2
)⇔
(n2 − (n− 2)2).(n2 − (n− 1)2) < (2n2 − (n− 1)2).(n2 − (n− 2)2)⇔
(2n2−n2−4+4n).(n2−n2−1+2n) < (2n2−n2−1+2n).(n2−n2−4n+4n)⇔
(n2 − 4n+ 4n).(2n− 1) < (n2 + 2n− 1).(4n− 4)⇔
3
2
< n.
which is always true.
13
So {n, n− 2} is the best coalition for player n to form as it minimizes his cost
of using the service among all possible coalitions with two players.
Stability:
By a simple calculation like example 1, one could check that {n, n − 2} is
stable.
6 Theorems
Theorem 6.1 In the Airport Problem, if the Shapley value is the rule of
allocating the worth of a coalition among its members, the grand coalition would
not form. The only two member stable coalition which forms would be{n, n−2}.
Proof. By the characteristic of the cost structure and the assumption that
if j is the maximum type of airplanes cooperating in coalition S, the band
built by this coalition is usable for all aircrafts of type i ≤ j, if n 6∈ S the
band built by coalition S can not support all types of airplanes especially the
type n, so another band for the use of player n must be built. If two bands
are built, as the marginal cost of using the band is zero, the charge fee that
the two coalitions which have built the bands can get from other players not
cooperating with these coalitions would be much less than when there is only
one band. Because if one of them charges the amount a for a type of airplane,
the other would suggest a−ε to the same type as the marginal cost of using the
band is zero, so the previous one would suggest a− 2ε and so on. This process
continues until the charge fee of those types of planes outside the coalitions
decreases to a small amount that it is better for the members of the coalition
to join the grand coalition. In this case, the cost which each player of coalition
S should pay is much higher than the charge fee suggested by the coalition in
which player n is a member of, thus S would not form. As a result, a coalition
S will form only if n ∈ S. As all the players are aware of this fact, they just
cooperate with coalition S if n ∈ S. Now we explore which type of planes is
the best one for player n to cooperate with. For the case that the coalition has
two members, the best type to cooperate with is the one which minimizes the
net cost of using the band for player n. The net cost of player n is the cost
which he pays for the construction of the band minus his share of the revenue
of the coalition. Here the revenue of the coalition is the amount which other
types of aircrafts pays to the coalition to use the band built by it.
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First we consider the coalition {n, n− 1}:
The Shapley value allocates the cost of:
Φ(n){n,n−1} = Cn − Cn−12
Φ(n− 1){n,n−1} = Cn−1
2
Potential charge of other players is Cn−2 because c({1, 2, ..., n}\{n, n − 1}) =
Cn−2. So the net cost for each of the players will be:
NC(n){n,n−1} = (Cn − Cn−12 ).(1− Cn−2Cn )(I)
NC(n− 1){n,n−1} = (Cn−1
2
).(1− Cn−2
Cn
)
If the coalition {n, k}, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n− 2} forms, we would have:
Φ(n){n,k} = Cn − Ck2
Φ(n){n,k} = Ck
2
in this case, potential charge of other players would be Cn−1 as c({1, 2, ..., n}\{n, n−
2}) = Cn−1, so the net cost for each of the will be:
NC(n){n,k} = (Cn − Ck2 ).(1− Cn−1Cn )
NC(k){n,k} = Ck
2
.(1− Cn−1
Cn
)
Player n minimizes his cost. So Ck should be maximized, thus k = n − 2 is
the best player for player n to form the two member coalition with among all
players in the set {1, 2, ..., n− 2}.
MinkNC(n)
{n,k} = (Cn − Cn−22 ).(1− Cn−1Cn )(II)
Min{(I), (II)} = (II) as:
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(Cn − Cn−22 ).(1− Cn−1Cn ) < (Cn −
Cn−1
2
).(1− Cn−2
Cn
)⇔
(2Cn − Cn−2)(Cn − Cn−1) < (2Cn − Cn−1)(Cn − Cn−1)⇔
2C2n−2CnCn−1−CnCn−2+Cn−1Cn−2 < 2C2n−2CnCn−2−CnCn−1+Cn−1Cn−2 ⇔
Cn(Cn−2 − Cn−1) < 0.
The last inequality always holds as due to our assumption Cn−2 < Cn−1. More
is the difference of Cn−1 and Cn−2 , more incentive has player n to form the
coalition with n− 2 rather than n− 1.
Stability:
Now we calculate the net cost for player n− 2 in the coalition {n, n− 2}:
NC(n− 2){n,n−2} = (Cn−2
2
).(1− Cn−1
Cn
)
This amount is the minimum net cost of using the band for player n − 2 be-
cause if he does not accept this choice the best thing that he can do is to form
the coalition {1, 2, ..., n− 2, n− 1} in which he should pay the cost of:
y
{1,2,...,n}
n−2 =
C1
n−1 +
C2−C1
n−2 + ...+ Cn−2 − Cn−3
which is absolutely higher than his net cost in the case of cooperating with
player n. Therefore the coalition {n, n − 2} is stable as it minimizes the cost
of using the band for both the players n and n− 2 among all possible cases of
cooperation or acting individually.
If player n wants to form the grand coalition and accept the Shapley value
allocation rule to allocate the cost of building the band among the players, the
cost which he should pay would be:
NC(n){1,2,...,n} = C1
n
+ C2−C1
n−1 + ...+ Cn − Cn−1.
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which is much higher than NC(n){n,n−2}.
If coalition {(i1, i2, ..., ik)}, ij ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, i1 < i2 < ... < ik forms, the allo-
cated cost to player ij by the Shapley value would be:
NC(ij)
{(i1,i2,...,ik)} = Ci1
k
+
Ci2−Ci1
k−1 + ...+ Cij − Cij−1 .(III)
From the above formula it is clear that even participating in coalitions with
many players if the rule of allocating the cost is the Shapley value is not op-
timum for player n as his net cost in coalition {n, n−2} is much less than (III).
Definition 6.1 Proportionality rule: In a coalition each player of the coali-
tion gets as much as the cost that he has paid proportional to the total cost of
the coalition -to produce the service on which the members of the coalition
cooperate- from the revenue of the cooperation.
Theorem 6.2 In the Airport Problem, if proportionality is the rule of allo-
cating the worth of a coalition among its members, grand coalition would not
form. If the condition:
(Cn − Cn−1).(C1 + ...+ Cn−3 + Cn−1) < Cn−1.(Cn−2 + Cn)
holds, The only two member stable coalition which forms would be {n, n− 2}.
Proof.
Like the first part of the proof of theorem 6.1, we should have n ∈ S so that
coalition S forms and could charge other players who are not a member of S.
Now we would find the best partner for player n to form a two member coali-
tion. If coalition {n, n−1} forms, the cost which each of the two players should
pay to build the runway would be:
y(n){n,n−1} = Cn
Cn−1+Cn
.Cn
y(n− 1){n,n−1} = Cn−1
Cn−1+Cn
.Cn
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This coalition potentially can charge other players Cn−2. As they get from the
charged fee their share proportional to what they have paid to build the band
-We have assumed this is a norm in the society of players- so, the net cost of
using the band for each of them would be:
NC(n){n,n−1} = Cn
Cn−1+Cn
.Cn − CnCn−1+Cn .Cn−2 = CnCn−1+Cn [Cn − Cn−2](I)
NC(n− 1){n,n−1} = Cn−1
Cn−1+Cn
[Cn − Cn−2]
If coalition {n, k}, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n− 2} forms, the cost allocated to each of the
players would be:
y(n){n,k} = Cn
Ck+Cn
.Cn
y(k){n,k} = Ck
Ck+Cn
.Cn
and the net cost of each player of using the service would be:
NC(n){n,k} = Cn
Ck+Cn
.[Cn − Cn−1]
NC(k){n,k} = Ck
Ck+Cn
.[Cn − Cn−1]
The minimum of the net cost for player n among all players k, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n−
2} takes place when Ck is maximized. As we have C1 < C2 < ... < Cn, this
minimum takes place at k = n− 2. So we have:
MinkNC(n)
{n,k} = Min Cn
Ck+Cn
.[Cn − Cn−1] = CnCn−2+Cn .[Cn − Cn−1](II)
Min{(I), (II)} = Min{ Cn
Cn−1+Cn
.[Cn − Cn−2], CnCn−2+Cn .[Cn − Cn−1]}
We claim that always (II) < (I).
Proof.
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Cn
Cn−1+Cn
.[Cn − Cn−2] > CnCn−2+Cn .[Cn − Cn−1]⇔
Cn−Cn−2
Cn−1+Cn
> Cn−Cn−1
Cn−2+Cn
⇔
C2n − C2n−2 > C2n − C2n−1 ⇔ C2n−2 < C2n−1 ⇔ Cn−2 < Cn−1.
due to the assumption of C1 < C2 < ... < Cn, the last inequality always hold.
So the best partner for player n would be n−2 to form a two member coalition
to produce the band and then charge the other users as the coalition {n, n−2}
minimized the net cost of using the band for player n among all the two mem-
ber coalitions containing player n.
On the other hand the cost of using the band for player n in the grand coalition
would be:
NC(n){1,2,...,n} = Cn
C1+C2+...+Cn
.Cn(III)
we claim that always (II) < (III).
Proof.
Cn
Cn−2+Cn
.[Cn − Cn−1] < CnC1+C2+...+Cn .Cn ⇔
[C1 + C2 + ...+ Cn].(Cn − Cn−1) < Cn.(Cn−2 + Cn)⇔
Cn.[Cn − Cn−2] + Cn.[C1 + ...+ Cn−3 + Cn−1]− Cn−1.[C1 + ...+ Cn] <
Cn.(Cn−2 + Cn)⇔ Cn.(
∑n
i=1Ci − Cn−2 − Cn) < Cn−1.
∑n
i=1Ci
−Cn.(Cn−2 + Cn) < (Cn−1 − Cn).
∑n
i=1Ci ⇔
(Cn − Cn−1).(C1 + ...+ Cn−3 + Cn−1 + Cn−2 + Cn) < Cn.(Cn−2 + Cn)⇔
(Cn − Cn−1).(C1 + ...+ Cn−3 + Cn−1) + (Cn − Cn−1).(Cn−2 + Cn) <⇔
Cn.(Cn−2+Cn)⇔ (Cn−Cn−1).(C1+...+Cn−3+Cn−1) < Cn−1.(Cn−2+Cn).(IV )
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The inequality (IV ) holds if (Cn−Cn−1) is not too large like the case of Airport
Problem in real situations. If (Cn−Cn−1) be so large such that this inequality
does not hold, player n would not need to cooperate with any player and he
would build the runway alone. The inequality (IV ) also shows that if the rule
of cooperation be proportionality, when player n would cooperate and when
he would act alone.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have considered the Airport Problem and we have shown
that if we have n types of airplanes such that C1 < C2 < ... < Cn, by the
assumption that each player can build the band usable for himself or those
who have a smaller cost of band construction than his, it is more profitable for
some players like player n to form another coalition than the grand coalition
and then charge the other players for using the product of their cooperation.
Furthermore, in the case that the coalitions with two players form, we have
found the coalition which would form independent of the cost structure which
can be linear, concave or convex would be {n, n− 2}.
In addition the optimum charge fees for the total players who are not par-
ticipating in the coalition are determined such that they prefer the choice of
paying the charged fee rather than to form another coalition. We have shown
that if coalition {n, n− 2} forms and build the runway and then charges other
players such as we described in the paper, the cost of using the band would be
much less than the case that players n, n−2 cooperate with the grand coalition
and obey the Shapley value for the distribution the worth of the coalition or
the cost of building the band. As a result, some players like player n will not
participate in the grand or even large coalitions with many players because
they can have more profit by not cooperating with them. Therefore, the grand
coalition or coalitions with many players will lead to less profit for the some
players if the rule of distribution the value of coalition is the Shapley value or
the proportional rule. Hence, the Shapley value rule of distribution the gain of
cooperation does not lead to form the grand coalition in the Airport Problem.
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